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Abstract. Formal methods have proved effective to automatically analyze pro-
tocols. Over the past years, much research has focused on verifying trace equiv-
alence on protocols, which is notably used to model many interesting privacy
properties, e.g., anonymity or unlinkability. Many tools for checking trace equiv-
alence rely on a naive and expensive exploration of all interleavings of concurrent
actions, which calls for partial-order reduction (POR) techniques. In this paper,
we present the first POR technique for protocol equivalences that does not rely on
an action-determinism assumption: we recast the trace equivalence problem as a
reachability problem, to which persistent and sleep set techniques can be applied,
and we show how to effectively apply these results in the context of symbolic ex-
ecutions. We report on a prototype implementation, improving the tool DeepSec.
1 Introduction
Security protocols are notoriously difficult to design, and their flaws can have a huge
impact. Leaving aside implementation flaws and weaknesses of cryptographic primi-
tives, there is already a long history of logical mistakes in the basic design of protocols,
e.g., [28,6,12,5]. At this level of detail, protocols can however be represented in the so-
called symbolic model, which makes them amenable to automated formal verification.
This approach has lead to mature tools and industrial successes, e.g., [13,7,29].
Verification techniques have focused at first on reachability properties of protocols,
used to model, e.g., the secrecy or authenticity or messages. More recently, equivalence
properties have received a lot of attention, as they are often necessary to model privacy
properties such as ballot secrecy in e-voting [23], anonymity or unlinkability [5,14].
Equivalence verification is complex, and the various state-of-the-art techniques each
have their own limitations. Tools for verifying scenarios with an unbounded number of
sessions such as ProVerif [13] or Tamarin [32] are usually efficient but only support a
constrained form of equivalence, namely diff-equivalence, which is too limiting, e.g., to
model unlinkability [27]. Many tools for verifying bounded scenarios rely on symbolic
execution [22]. For instance, Apte [16] and its successor DeepSec [19] implement an
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algorithm that explores all symbolic executions, maintaining pairs of sets of symbolic
states and solving, at each step, complex equality, deducibility and indistinguishability
constraints. Akiss [15] follows a different approach, enumerating all symbolic execu-
tions to check that none yields an non-equivalence witness. The strength of these tools
is that they decide trace equivalence, which can adequately capture privacy goals such
as unlinkability. However, their algorithms are very costly. Although much progress has
been made, it is still only possible to analyze relatively small scenarios in a reasonable
amount of time.
All the techniques mentioned above for deciding trace equivalence of security pro-
tocols rely on an enumeration of all symbolic executions including all interleavings
of concurrent actions. This is obviously a cause of major inefficiency, which has lead
to the quest for partial-order reduction (POR) techniques. These techniques, which
have a long and successful history in traditional software verification [26,31,10], gen-
erally consist in leveraging action independencies to restrict the interleavings that a
model-checking algorithm explores. In the context of verifying reachability properties
for security protocols, some specific POR techniques have sometimes had to be de-
vised [20,30], but there have also been successful uses of generic POR techniques such
as sleep sets [21] (see [9] for a detailed discussion). In the context of verifying equiva-
lences for security protocols, the only available POR techniques are, to the best of our
knowledge, the ones we proposed in [8,9]. These ad hoc techniques have lead to sig-
nificant performance gains in Apte and DeepSec [19,9]. However, they crucially rely
on an action-determinism assumption (i.e., once the observable trace is fixed, the sys-
tem is deterministic) which is very limiting in practice. For instance, there is no precise
modeling of unlinkability involving action-deterministic systems.
In this paper, we present the first POR technique for checking trace equivalence on
security protocols, without any action-determinism assumption. Our first step towards
this goal is to recast the trace equivalence problem as a reachability problem in a care-
fully designed labeled transition system (LTS), to which we can then apply persistent
and sleep set techniques. However, this result is not directly useful in practice, for sev-
eral reasons. First, this LTS is infinitely branching, due to the arbitrary choices that the
attacker can make when interacting with the protocol. This is the main issue addressed
in protocol equivalence checkers, typically through symbolic execution. Second, deter-
mining when two actions are independent (the first ingredient of POR techniques) is far
from obvious in our LTS. Independencies are often approximated through simple static
checks in practical POR algorithms [26] but, as we shall see, it does not seem feasible
in our setting without losing too many independencies. Instead, we determine indepen-
dencies by exploring symbolic executions. We ignore constraint solving in that process,
as it would be too expensive: this trade-off allows us to detect enough independencies
at a reasonable cost. More generally, we show how to compute persistent sets in the
same style, to eventually obtain a symbolic form of the sleep set technique. Third, the
direct symbolic approach would still be overly expensive, due to another typical state
explosion problem caused by conditionals [11]. We circumvent it by showing that con-
ditionals can be simplified, and often eliminated, in a way that does not affect persistent
set computations. This approach yields a POR technique that is fast enough and allows
to significantly reduce the number of symbolic traces to consider when checking equiv-
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alences. The technique is also independent of the specific verification algorithms that
will be used to check equivalence along the reduced set of traces. We implement it as a
library, and integrate it in DeepSec to validate the approach experimentally.
Outline. We present a standard security protocol model in Section 2. After recalling
persistent and sleep set techniques in Section 3, we design in Section 4 our concrete
equivalence LTS to which they apply. Section 5 then defines a symbolic abstraction of
this LTS, and shows how it can be used to obtain effective POR algorithms, notably
through the collapse of conditionals. Finally, we present our implementations and ex-
perimental results in Section 6. Detailed proofs and additional examples are given in
Appendices A,B,C,D.
2 Model for security protocols
As is common, we model security protocols in a variant of the applied pi-calculus [2]:
processes exchange messages represented by terms quotiented by an equational theory.
2.1 Syntax
We assume a number of disjoint and infinite sets: a set Ch of channels, denoted by c
or d; a set N of names, denoted by n or k; a set X of variables, denoted by x, y, z;
and a set W of handles of the form wc,i with c ∈ Ch and i ∈ N, which will be used
for referring to previously output terms. Next, we consider a signature Σ consisting of
a set of function symbols together with their arity. Terms over a set of atomic data A,
written T (A), are inductively generated from A and function symbols from Σ. When
A ⊆ N , elements of T (A) are called messages and written m. When A ⊆ W , they are
called recipes and written M , N . Intuitively, recipes express how a message has been
derived by the environment from the messages obtained so far. Finally, we consider an
equational theory E over terms to assign a meaning to function symbols in Σ.
Protocols are then modelled through processes using the following grammar:
P,Q := 0 | in(c, x).P | out(c, u).P | if u = v then P else Q | (P | Q) | P +Q
where c ∈ Ch, u, v ∈ T (N unionmulti X ) and x ∈ X . The process 0 does nothing. The
process in(c, x).P expects a message m on the public channel c, and then behaves
like P{x 7→ m}, i.e., P in which x has been replaced by m. The process out(c, u).P
outputs u on the public channel c, and then behaves like P . We have constructions
to perform tests (modulo E), parallel composition, and non-deterministic choice. We do
not consider replication, and thus we do not need a specific “new” operation: we assume
that names are implicitly freshly generated.
Example 1. Consider the signature Σ = {enc, dec, h}, where h is a free symbol repre-
senting an hash function, whereas symmetric encryption will be modelled through the
equation dec(enc(x, y), y) = x. We model a simple challenge/response protocol where
an agent sends a fresh random number n encrypted with a shared symmetric key k as a
challenge, then waits for an answer of the form enc(h(n), k), as follows:
Pchallenge = out(c, enc(n, k)).in(c, x).if x = enc(h(n), k) then Psuccess else Pfail
| in(d, y).out(d, enc(h(dec(y, k)), k)).0
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2.2 Semantics
A configuration K is a pair (P;φ) such that:
– P is a multiset of processes with no free variable, or a special object⊥i with i ∈ N;
– φ = {w1 . m1, . . . , wn . mn} is a frame, i.e., a substitution where w1, . . . , wn are
handles inW , and m1, . . . ,mn are messages, i.e., terms in T (N ).
Configurations (⊥i, φ) are called ghost configurations dead at age i, and will only be-
come useful in Section 4. Other configurations are said to be alive.
Operational semantics are given as an LTS on (alive) configurations, with the rela-
tion α7−→ defined next. There, the index of the next output to be performed on channel c
is defined as #c(dom(φ)) = max({0} ∪ {j + 1 | wc,j ∈ dom(φ)}).
({in(c, x).Q} unionmulti P;φ) in(c,M)7−−−−−→ ({Q{x 7→Mφ}} unionmulti P;φ) if M ∈ T (dom(φ))
({out(c, u).Q} unionmulti P;φ) out(c,wc,i)7−−−−−−−→ ({Q} unionmulti P;φ ∪ {wc,i . u}) with i = #c(dom(φ))
({if u = v then Q1 else Q2} unionmulti P;φ) τ7−→ ({Q1} unionmulti P;φ) if u =E v
({if u = v then Q1 else Q2} unionmulti P;φ) τ7−→ ({Q2} unionmulti P;φ) if u 6=E v
({Q1+Q2} unionmulti P;φ) τ7−→ ({Q1} unionmulti P;φ) ({Q1+Q2} unionmulti P;φ) τ7−→ ({Q2} unionmulti P;φ)
({Q1 | Q2} unionmulti P;φ) τ7−→ ({Q1, Q2} unionmulti P;φ) ({0} unionmulti P;φ) τ7−→ (P;φ)
A process may input a term that an attacker built using the knowledge available to
him through the frame, where messages output by the protocol are added. The output
rule slightly differs from the standard one, which would use a fresh handle variable.
Our use of fixed constants wc,i makes it possible to view the transition system as a
standard LTS, without any notion of freshness or α-renaming. Anticipating on the next
sections where we build on top of this a different LTS encoding trace equivalence, we
note that this design choice does not create spurious dependencies. We do not need to
model internal communications since we assume public channels: all communications
are controlled by the attacker. The last rules evaluate conditionals (modulo E), break
parallel operators, remove null processes, and perform non-deterministic choices.
The relation K0 α1...αk7−−−−→ K between configurations, where k ≥ 0 and each αi is an
observable or a τ action, is defined in the usual way. Given a sequence tr of actions, we
denote obs(tr) the sequence of actions obtained by erasing τ actions.
Example 2. Continuing Example 1, and starting with K0 = (Pchallenge; ∅) we have that:
K0 out(c,wc,0).in(d,wc,0).out(d,wd,0).in(c,wd,0).τ7−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ (Psuccess;φ)
where φ =E {wc,0 . enc(n, k), wd,0 . enc(h(n), k)}.
2.3 Equivalences
Many privacy-type properties (e.g., ballot secrecy in evoting, unlinkability) are mod-
elled relying on trace equivalence. In our setting, this behavioural equivalence relies on
a notion of static equivalence that captures indistinguishable sequences of messages.
Definition 1. Two frames φ and ψ are in static equivalence, φ ∼s ψ, when dom(φ) =
dom(ψ), and Mφ =E Nφ iff Mψ =E Nψ for any recipes M,N ∈ T (dom(φ)).
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Now, we lift this notion of equivalence from sequence of messages to configuration.
Definition 2. Let KP = (P;φ) and KQ = (Q;ψ) be two alive configurations with
dom(φ) = dom(ψ). We write KP vt KQ if for every execution KP tr17−−→ (P ′;φ′), there
exists tr2 and (Q′;ψ′) such that KQ tr27−−→ (Q′;ψ′), obs(tr1) = obs(tr2) and φ′ ∼s ψ′.
Then, KP ≈t KQ, if KP vt KQ and KQ vt KP .
We provide in Appendix A a description of the BAC protocol (e-passport) [5] in our
model, together with the formalisation in terms of trace inclusion of the unlinkability
property that it is supposed to achieve. We also recall there the action-determinism as-
sumption required in previous works [8,9], and argue why it makes it impossible to ad-
equately model privacy properties such as unlinkability. Similarly, the diff-equivalence
used in ProVerif and Tamarin systematically leads to false attacks on unlinkability [27].
For such properties, one thus has to resort to verifying trace equivalence in the bounded
setting but, the lack of POR techniques supporting non-action-deterministic processes
is a major problem, since equivalence verification tools perform very poorly when the
state explosion problem is left untamed.
3 Persistent and sleep sets in a nutshell
We review the key concepts of persistent and sleep sets, based on [26] but slightly
reformulated. These general concepts apply to an action-deterministic LTS. We thus
assume, in this section, a set of states Q, a set of actions T , and a partial transition
function δ : Q×T → Q. We write s α−→ s′ when s′ = δ(s, α). We say that α is enabled
in state s if there exists an s′ such that s′ = δ(s, α). The set of enabled actions in s is
written E (s). A state s is final when E(s) = ∅.
Definition 3. Independence is the greatest relation↔ ⊆ T ×Q×T that is symmetric,
irreflexive and such that, for all (α, s, β) ∈↔, also written α↔s β, we have:
– if s α−→ s′ then β ∈ E(s) iff β ∈ E(s′);
– if s α−→ s1 and s β−→ s2, then s1 β−→ s′ and s2 α−→ s′ for some s′.
Persistent sets. A set T ⊆ E (s) is persistent in s if, for all non-empty sequences of
actions s = s0
α0−→ s1 . . . sn αn−−→ sn+1 such that αi 6∈ T for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n, we have
that αn ↔sn α for all α ∈ T . We may note that E (s) is persistent in s. In practice,
persistent sets may be computed from stubborn sets (see Appendix B).
In the following, we assume a function pset : Q×T ∗ → 2T which associates to any
state s ∈ Q and any sequence w such that s w−→ s′ with E (s′) 6= ∅, a non-empty set of
actions which is persistent in s′. A trace s0
α0−→ s1 . . . αn−−→ sn+1 is persistent, written
s0
α0...αn−−−−−→pset sn+1, if αi ∈ pset(s0, α0 . . . αi−1) for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n.
Proposition 1. Let s′ be a final state that is reachable from s. We have that s′ is also
reachable from s through a trace that is persistent.
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Sleep sets. If a persistent set contains two independent actions, then the associated search
has redundancies. This has lead to the introduction of sleep sets that are formulated
below. The technique relies on an arbitrary ordering< on actions. A sleep set execution
is an execution (s0, ∅) = (s0, z0) α0−→ (s1, z1) . . . αn−−→ (sn+1, zn+1) with states in
Q × 2T such that s0 α0...αn−−−−−→pset sn+1, and for any 0 ≤ i ≤ n we have αi 6∈ zi and
zi+1 = {β ∈ zi | αi ↔si}β ∪ {β ∈ pset(s0, α0 . . . αi−1) | β < αi, αi ↔si β}.
Proposition 2. If a final state is reachable from s in the original LTS, then it is also
reachable from (s, ∅) through a sleep set execution.
4 Concrete LTS for security protocols
In order to apply the POR techniques of Section 3, we need to reformulate trace equiv-
alence as a reachability property of final states in some LTS.
Given a set of handlesW ⊆ W , we define Conf(W ) as the set of alive and quiescent
configurations with a frame of domain W . An alive configuration (P;φ) is quiescent if
any P ∈ P is of the form in(c, x).P ′ or out(c, t).P ′ (in other words, no τ action can
be triggered from it). We define Conf⊥(W ) = {(⊥j ;φ) | dom(φ) ⊆W and j ∈ N}.
We define our trace equivalence LTS as follows:
– States are of the form 〈|A ≈ B|〉 where A,B ⊆ Conf(W ) ∪ Conf⊥(W ) for some
W ⊆ W , and at least one configuration in A ∪ B is alive. The domain dom(s) of
such a state is W , and its age is age(s) = max({0} ∪ {j + 1 | (⊥j , φ) ∈ A ∪ B}).
– Actions are of the form out(c,wc,i) or in(c,M) with c ∈ Ch, i ∈ N, M ∈ T (W).
– The transition relation is given by
s = 〈|A ≈ B|〉 α−→ 〈|Ag unionmulti An unionmulti Aa ≈ Bg unionmulti Bn unionmulti Ba|〉
where Ag , Aa, An are given below (and Bg , Bn, and Ba are defined similarly):
• Ag = A ∩ Conf⊥(dom(s)),
• Aa = {A′ | ∃A ∈ A such that A α7−→ A′′ τ
∗
7−→ A′ 6 τ7−→}, and
• An = {(⊥age(s);φ) | (P;φ) ∈ A, (P;φ) is alive, (P;φ) 6 α7−→}.
The transitions gather all alternatives that can perform the same output (resp. input)
action. Therefore, even if our protocol allows several alternatives for a given observable
action, our resulting trace equivalence LTS is action-deterministic. Configurations that
cannot execute such an action become ghosts. A ghost configuration (⊥i;φ) is a con-
figuration that cannot evolve anymore, and the index i is a crucial piece of information
one needs to keep to know what other frames were present at that time (see Example 3).
Given a set of configurations A, we define A≥i as the set of all configurations of A
that are still alive at age i. More formally, we have that:
A≥i = {(P, φ) ∈ A | (P, φ) is alive or P = ⊥j with j ≥ i}
We write φ vs ψ when dom(φ) ⊆ dom(ψ) and both frames are in static equivalence
on their common domain, i.e., φ ∼s ψ|dom(φ). We lift vs to a set of frames (and thus
configurations) as follows: φ vs Ψ when there exists ψ ∈ Ψ such that φ vs ψ.
Definition 4. A state s = 〈|A ≈ B|〉 is left-bad when there exists (P;φ) ∈ A such that:
– either (P;φ) is a ghost, i.e., P = ⊥j for some j, and φ 6vs B≥j;
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– or (P;φ) is alive and φ 6vs (B ∩ Conf(dom(s))).
The notion of being right-bad is defined similarly, and we say that a state s is bad when
it is right-bad or left-bad.
We will see that trace non-equivalence implies the existence of a bad state. Thanks to
ghosts, this will directly imply the existence of a final bad state. Fundamentally, ghosts
are there to avoid that partial-order reduction makes us miss a bad state by not explor-
ing certain transitions. Of course, practical verification algorithms will never perform
explorations past a state that corresponds to a non-equivalence witness. Note, however,
that detecting such states is only possible thanks to complex constraint solving, which
we cannot afford in our symbolic POR algorithms. Hence, one important aspect in our
design of ghosts is that they lift well to the “unsolved” symbolic setting.
Example 3. Ghosts are crucial to make sure that progressing in the LTS never kills a
witness of non-equivalence. For instance, consider the two processes:
Pu = out(c, u)+(out(c, n).out(d, n
′)) where u ∈ {a, b} are two public constants.
Consider s0 = 〈|(Pa; ∅) ≈ (Pb; ∅)|〉 and s0 out(c,wc,0)−−−−−−−→ s1 out(d,wd,0)−−−−−−−→ s2 where:
– s1 = 〈|{(0; {wc,0 . a}), A} ≈ {(0; {wc,0 . b}), A}|〉
– s2 = 〈|{(⊥0; {wc,0 . a}), A′} ≈ {(⊥0; {wc,0 . b}), A′}|〉
– A = (out(d, n′); {wc,0 . n}), and A′ = (0; {wc,0 . n,wd,0 . n′}).
Note that s1 is (left-)bad because {w0c . a} 6∼s {w0c . b} and s2 is (left-)bad because
the ghost configurations are not statically equivalent either. However, without the ghost
configurations, s2 would not be bad (neither left nor right).
The following result reduces trace equivalence to reachability of a final bad state in
the trace equivalence LTS, on which the POR techniques of Section 3 can be applied.
Proposition 3. Let A0 and B0 be two alive configurations of same domain, and s0 =
〈|A0 ≈ B0|〉 where A0 = {A | A0 τ
∗
7−→ A 6 τ7−→}, and B0 = {B | B0 τ
∗
7−→ B 6 τ7−→}. The
following conditions are equivalent:
1. A0 is trace included in B0, i.e., A0 vt B0;
2. no left-bad state is reachable from s0 in the trace-equivalence LTS;
3. no left-bad, final state is reachable from s0 in the trace-equivalence LTS.
5 POR in symbolic semantics
The POR techniques of Section 3 apply to the LTS of Section 4, but this is not directly
usable in practice because our trace equivalence LTS is infinitely branching. Symbolic
execution is typically used to circumvent such problems, both in traditional software
verification [11] and security protocol analysis [17,18]. In this section, we define a
symbolic abstraction of our trace equivalence LTS, and we show how it can be used to
effectively apply the persistent and sleep set techniques.
7
5.1 Symbolic equivalence LTS
As is common in symbolic semantics for security protocols [17,18], we rely on second-
order variables, which will be instantiated by recipes, and first-order variables, which
will be instantiated by messages. First-order variables are distinct from standard vari-
ables occurring in processes to represent input messages. More precisely, when an input
is executed symbolically, the associated variable will be substituted by a first-order vari-
able. As a result, standard variables will only occur bound in symbolic processes, while
first-order variables will only occur free. Conversely, only first-order variables will be
allowed to occur free in processes, frames, and states.
Second-order and first-order variables will respectively be of the form Xc,i and xc,iφ
where c ∈ Ch, i ∈ N, and φ is a symbolic frame, i.e., a frame whose terms may
contain first-order variables. Intuitively, Xc,i stands for the recipe used for the ith input
on channel c, and xc,iφ will be instantiated by the message resulting from that recipe in
the context of the frame φ. The use of variables with explicit c, i parameters avoids us to
deal with freshness or α-renaming issues when implementing the symbolic analysis. We
denote vars1(t) (resp. vars2(t)) the first-order (resp. second-order) variable occurring
in t. Finally, vars(R) is the set of handles that occur in a recipe R. We say that a
symbolic frame φ is well-founded if, whenever φ(wc,i) = t and x
d,j
ψ ∈ vars1(t), it
holds that ψ ( φ. This well-foundedness condition will obviously be preserved in
symbolic executions: if t is the ith output on channel c, it may only depend on inputs
received before that output, i.e., at a time where the frame ψ does not contain wc,i.
From now on, we impose that all frames are well-founded, which allows us to define
the first-order substitution associated to a second-order substitution.
Definition 5 (λθ). Let θ be a substitution mapping second-order variables to recipes.
Its associated first-order substitution λθ is the unique substitution of (infinite) domain
{xc,iφ | vars(Xc,iθ) ⊆ dom(φ)} such that λθ(xc,iφ ) = (Xc,iθ)(φλθ), which can be de-
fined by induction on the size of frame domains.
We now define symbolic actions and states, and their concretisations. We take sym-
bolic actions of the form out(c,wc,i) and in(c,Xc,i,W ), where c ∈ Ch, i ∈ N and
W ⊆ W . Given a substitution θ mapping second-order variables to recipes, we define
the θ-concretisations of symbolic actions as follows: out(c,wc,i)θ = out(c,wc,i), and
in(c,Xc,i,W )θ = in(c,R) when Xc,iθ = R ∈ T (W ).
We will use constraints which are conjunctions of equations and disequations over
(open) terms. The empty constraint is written >, and conjunction is written ∧ and con-
sidered modulo associativity-commutativity.
A symbolic state S = 〈A ≈ B〉IC is formed from a mapping I : Ch → N providing
input numbers, a constraint C, and two sets A and B of symbolic configurations, i.e.,
configurations that may contain first-order variables. We further require that:
– there is at least one alive configurations in A ∪ B;
– all alive configurations of A ∪ B share the same frame domain, noted dom(S);
– any ghost configuration in A ∪ B should have a domain W ⊆ dom(S);
– processes in configurations do not contain null processes, and do not feature top-
level conditionals, parallel and choice operators.
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With this in place, we define the solutions of S = 〈A ≈ B〉IC as the set Sol(S) containing
all the substitutions θ such that:
– dom(θ) = {Xc,i | i < I(c)} and vars1(S) ⊆ dom(λθ);
– for any u = v (resp. u 6= v) in C, uλθ =E vλθ (resp. uλθ 6=E vλθ).
Given a state S, and θ ∈ Sol(S), we define its θ-concretisation Sθ as 〈|Aλθ ≈ Bλθ|〉.
Remark 1. Beyond the differences in formalism, our notion of solution is quite close
to ones found, e.g., in [17,18], with one difference: when no xc,iφ variable occurs in S,
θ(Xc,i) is completely unconstrained. This means that when an input variable is unused
in the input’s continuations, our solutions are incorrect wrt. the corresponding recipe.
We do not need to worry about this mismatch, though, because we only need a symbolic
semantics that covers all concrete executions; it does not need to be sound. In fact, our
analysis will never rely on the existence of a solution for a given symbolic state. It will
never check that a term is deducible, and will almost ignore (dis)equality constraints,
only checking for immediate contradictions among them.
We can now define symbolic transitions, and establish their completeness.
Definition 6. Consider a symbolic state S = 〈A ≈ B〉IC and a symbolic action A, the
possible transitions S A S′ are defined by mimicking concrete transitions as follows:
– We first execute the action A, gathering all possible resulting configurations into a
pre-state SA = 〈A′ ≈ B′〉I′C . To be possible, such a transition has to be of the form
A = in(c,Xc,i,W ) with i = I(c), or A = out(c,wc,i) with i = #c(dom(S)).
The resulting pre-state SA is not a valid state because it may contain e.g., top-
level conditionals, choice operators. This pre-state also includes ghosts (⊥n;φ) of
the configurations (P;φ) of S that could not perform A, where n = age(S) as
defined in the concrete semantics. We define I ′ to coincide with I on all channels,
except on c where I ′(c) = I(c) + 1 when A is an input on c. When executing
A = in(c,Xc,i,W ) in a configuration (P;φ) of S that can perform an input on c,
we use the term xc,iφ|W to substitute for the input variable.
– Then we declare S A S′ if S′ is a state that can be obtained from SA by repeatedly
performing the following operations, until none applies:
• If a configuration features a top-level conditional, the conditional is replaced
by one of its branches, and the constraints are enriched accordingly.
• If a configuration features a top-level choice operator, it is replaced by the two
configurations where the choices are made.
We also require that S′ does not have an immediately contradicting constraint, i.e.,
a constraint containing an equation and its negation.
A perhaps surprising consequence of our definition is that, if in(c,Xc,i,W ) is ex-
ecutable in S, then any in(c,Xc,i,W ′) is also executable. Allowing smaller domains
is important for checking independencies. We also allow larger domains, possibly even
larger than dom(S), mainly because it simplifies the theory, at no cost in practice.
Example 4. Consider arbitrary terms t, u, and v 6= v′, and the symbolic state S =
〈(P;ψ) ≈ (P;ψ′)〉I> where P = in(c, x).if x = t then out(c, ok) else 0,
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φ = {wc,0 7→ u}, ψ = φ unionmulti {wd,0 7→ v} and ψ′ = φ unionmulti {wd,0 7→ v′}.
We illustrate how the choice of W affects which transitions are possible from state S
with action A = in(c,Xc,i,W ), where i = I(c) is the only value that allows this
action to execute, and I ′ coincides with I except on c for which I ′(c) = I(c) + 1. If
W = {wc,0}, then there are two possible transitions:
S
A 〈(out(c, ok);ψ) ≈ (out(c, ok);ψ′)〉I′
xc,iφ =t
S
A 〈(0;ψ) ≈ (0;ψ′)〉I′
xc,iφ 6=t
If W = {wc,0, wd,0}, four transitions are possible, notably including
S
A 〈(out(c, ok);ψ) ≈ (0;ψ′)〉I′
xc,iψ =t, x
c,i
ψ′ 6=t
.
Indeed, we are considering here an input whose recipe may exploit the different frames
of our two configurations. It is a priori possible that the resulting message passes the
test x = t only in one configuration.
Remark 2. Symbolic executions preserve various properties that we do not exploit, but
may be useful to state for intuitions. In a configuration (P;φ) of a state 〈A ≈ B〉IC , the
only first-order variables that appear are of the form xc,iψ with ψ ⊆ φ and i < I(c).
We note θ′ w θ when θ′ is an extension of θ, i.e., θ′|dom(θ) = θ.
Proposition 4. Let S = 〈A ≈ B〉IC be a symbolic state, θ ∈ Sol(S). Let s′ and α be
such that Sθ α−→ s′. There exists S′, A and θ′ w θ such that S A S′, θ′ ∈ Sol(S′),
α = Aθ′, and s′ = S′θ′. Moreover, if α is of the form in(c,R), the proposition holds
with A = in(c,Xc,I(c),W ) for any W such that vars(R) ⊆W .
5.2 Independence relations
We first define the enabled symbolic independence relation, and show that it is a sound
abstraction of independence for enabled actions. For that, we assume here a notion of
incompatible constraints. It can be anything as long as two constraints C and C′ are
only declared incompatible when C ∧ C′ is unsatisfiable. In practice, we only check for
immediate contradictions, i.e., the presence of an equation and its negation. This allows
us to easily check⇔ee in the implementation.
Definition 7. Given a symbolic state S, and two symbolic actions A and B executable
in S, we write A⇔eeS B when:
– A and B are neither two inputs nor two outputs on the same channel;
– for any S A SA, S B SB , we have that SA B SAB and SB A SBA for some
symbolic states SAB and SBA;
– for any S A SA B SAB , and S B SB A SBA, we have that SAB and SBA
have incompatible constraints, or SAB = SBA.
We now turn to defining a sound abstraction of independence between a concretely
disabled and enabled action. Intuitively, A ⇔deS B will guarantee that executing con-
cretisations of B cannot enable new concretisations of A.
Definition 8. Given a symbolic state S, as well as two symbolic actions A and B, we
write A⇔deS B when B is executable in S, and
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– either A is not executable in S′ for any S′ such that S B S′;
– or A is executable in S but A/B are not of the form in(c,Xc,i,W )/out(d,wd,j)
with wd,j ∈W .
Proposition 5. Let S be a symbolic state and A and B be two symbolic actions. Let
θ ∈ Sol(S), s = Sθ and α (resp. β) be a concretisation of A (resp. B).
– If A⇔eeS B, and α, β ∈ E (s), then α↔s β.
– If A⇔deS B, α 6∈ E (s) and β ∈ E (s), then α↔s β.
Example 5. Let P = in(c, x).out(c, x) | out(d, t), and S = 〈(P; ∅) ≈ (P; ∅)〉I0> with
I0(c) = 0 for any c ∈ Ch. We have in(c,Xc,0, ∅)⇔eeS out(d,wd,0): inputs and outputs
commute, for inputs whose recipes rely on the currently available (empty) domain. We
have in(c,Xc,0, ∅) ⇔deS out(d,wd,0) (the output does not enable new concretisations
for the input) but not in(c,Xc,0, {wd,0}) ⇔deS out(d,wd,0) (the input is feasible, but
performing it after the output would enable new concretisations).
5.3 Persistent set computation
Having defined over-approximations of transitions and dependencies, we now describe
how to compute, for a state S, a set of actions T+(S) that yields a persistent set for any
concretisation of S. More precisely, we shall compute stubborn sets (cf. Appendix B.2).
Our symbolic LTS is still infinitely branching, due to the absence of constraints
on inputs domains W . However, when exploring the LTS, it often suffices to consider
inputs with a canonical domain, i.e., the domain of the current state. We formalise this
by defining the enabled cover of a symbolic state S: EC (S) is the set of all actions that
are executable in S, with the constraint that inputs are of the form in(c,Xc,i,dom(S)).
Proposition 4 already ensures that any concrete action in E(Sθ) can be mapped to a
symbolic action in EC (S).
Definition 9. Let S be a symbolic state, A and B be two symbolic actions such that B
is executable in S. We say that A⇔S B when (i) A⇔deS B and, (ii) if A is executable
in S then A⇔eeS B.
Given a symbolic state S, we say that a set of actions X is a symbolic stubborn set
for S when X ∩ EC (S) 6= ∅ and, for any A ∈ X and any execution
S = S1
B1 S2 . . . Sn
Bn Sn+1 with Bi ∈ EC (Si) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n
such that A 6⇔Sn Bn, there exists 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that Bi ∈ X .
We assume a computable function which associates to any symbolic state S such
thatEC (S) 6= ∅ a set T+(S) that is a symbolic stubborn set for S. Computing T+(S) is
typically achieved as a least fixed point computation, initialising the set with an arbitrary
action in EC (S), exploring executions that avoid the current set and adding actions Bn
when they are dependent with an action already in the set. In this process all transitions
in the enabled cover of S and its successors are considered (unless they are in the
current set) without caring for the existence of a solution for the visited states. The
computation is carried out with each possible action of EC (S) as its initial set, and a
result of minimal cardinality is kept. In the worst case, it will be EC (S) itself.
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If done in a depth-first fashion, the computation is (a symbolic approximation of)
Godefroid’s stubborn set computation through first conflict relations [26]. It is however
much more efficient to perform the explorations in breadth, since the addition of an
action along an exploration can potentially prevent the continuation of another explo-
ration. In any case, the details of how T+(S) is computed do not matter for correctness.
Example 6. Consider the process P = in(c, x).Q | in(d, x).out(d, t).Q′ where Q, Q′
and t are arbitrary. Consider computing T+(S) for S = 〈(P ; ∅) ≈ (P ; ∅)〉I0> , initializ-
ing the set with A0 = in(c,Xc,0, ∅).
Since A0 ⇔S in(d,Xd,0, ∅) we have to explore successors of S by the input on d.
There is only one, call it S′. We have A0 ⇔S′ out(d,wd,0), so again we consider the
successor S′′ by the output action. We have A1 = in(c,Xc,0, {wd,0}) ∈ EC (S′′) with
A1 6⇔S′′ A0, hence we add A1 to our set. We repeat the process from S, exploring the
transition along in(d,Xd,0, ∅) ⇔S A1. But, we then have out(d,wd,0) 6⇔S′ A1, and
more precisely A1 6⇔deS′ out(d,wd,0). Hence we add A2 = out(d,wd,0) to our set.
Because A2 6⇔deS in(d,Xd,0, ∅) = A3, we will also add that action in the next itera-
tion. We thus obtain T+(S) = {A0, A1, A2, A3}, satisfying our specification of T+.
This symbolic stubborn set yields the symbolic persistent set T+(S) ∩ EC (S) =
{in(c,Xc,0, ∅), in(d,Xd,0, ∅)}; in that case, no reduction is possible. However, start-
ing with process P | out(e, t′).P ′ and initialising the set with A4 = out(e,we,0) will
often lead to a very good reduction, i.e., a singleton. This is not always the case, how-
ever, due to non-determinism and ghosts (i.e., when an output on e occurs in Q or Q′,
or when an action in another configuration creates a ghost).
Proposition 6. Let S be a symbolic state such that EC (S) 6= ∅, and consider T =
{Aθ | A ∈ T+(S)}. For any θ′ ∈ Sol(S), the set T ∩ E (Sθ′) is persistent in Sθ′.
Having computed symbolic persistent sets, we now define a persistent set assign-
ment pset for the concrete LTS. By completeness, we know that, for any concrete exe-
cution s0
α0−→ s1 . . . αn−1−−−→ sn there exists S0 A0 S1 . . . An−1 Sn and θ0 v θ1 . . . v θn
with θ0 the empty substitution, θi ∈ Sol(Si) and Siθi = si for all i ∈ [0;n], and
Aiθi+1 = αi for all i ∈ [0;n − 1]. We assume a choice function abs which, to
each such concrete execution associates a symbolic abstraction: abs(s0, α0 . . . αn−1) =
(S0, S1, . . . , Sn). We can assume that the choice is compatible with prefixing:
abs(s0, α0 . . . αn) = (Si)0≤i≤n+1 implies abs(s0, α0 . . . αn−1) = (Si)0≤i≤n.
Building on this, we define
pset(s0, α0 . . . αn−1) = {Aθ | A ∈ T+(Sn)} ∩ E (Snθn)
where abs(s0, α0 . . . αn−1) = (S0, . . . , Sn), which, by Proposition 6, is a persistent
set in sn (uniquely defined as the state reachable from s0 after α0 . . . αn−1). In other
words, we obtain the persistent set for a concrete state from the symbolic persistent set
of one of its symbolic abstractions, but we choose this abstraction depending on the
concrete execution and not only its resulting state.
With this in place, Proposition 1 guarantees that for any execution from s0 to a
final state sf , there exists a persistent execution (wrt. pset) from s0 to sf . Hence, the
search for final bad states can be restricted to only explore concretisations of symbolic
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persistent traces, i.e., symbolic executions where the only transitions considered for
a state S are those in T+(S) ∩ EC (S). We will make this more formal after having
applied sleep sets.
5.4 Symbolic sleep sets
We finally describe how we implement sleep sets symbolically. We shall define a sym-
bolic LTS with sleep sets, whose states (S,Z) compound a symbolic state S and a set
of symbolic actions Z. The sleep set technique relies on a strict ordering of actions,
but the order is only relevant for comparing independent actions, which do not have the
same skeleton (the skeleton of an action denotes its input/output nature and its channel).
Thus, we assume a strict total order < on action skeletons, and lift it to symbolic and
concrete actions.
Then, a sleep set execution in our symbolic LTS is any execution
(S0, ∅) = (S0, Z0) A0 (S1, Z1) . . . (Sn, Zn) An (Sn+1, Zn+1)
such that for 0 ≤ i ≤ n, we have that Ai ∈ T+(Si) ∩ EC (Si), Ai 6∈ Zi, and Zi+1 =
{B ∈ Z | B ⇔eeSi Ai} ∪ {A′ ∈ T+(Si) ∩ EC (Si) | A′ < Ai, A′ ⇔eeSi Ai}.
These symbolic sleep set executions are complete with respect to the sleep set tech-
nique applied to our concrete LTS with the pset function defined above.
Proposition 7. Let (s0, ∅) α0−→ (s1, z1) . . . αn−1−−−→ (sn, zn) be a sleep set execution
in our initial LTS. Then, there is (S0, ∅) A0 (S1, Z1) . . . An−1 (Sn, Zn) a sleep set
execution in our symbolic LTS, and substitutions ∅ = θ0 v θ1 . . . v θn such that
si = Siθi, αi = Aiθi+1 for i ∈ [1;n− 1], and sn = Snθn.
Example 7. Let S be the state from Example 6. Starting with (S, ∅) we may perform
two transitions in the sleep LTS: A0 = in(c,Xc,0, ∅) and A3 = in(d,Xd,0, ∅). Assum-
ing that A0 > A3 and S
A0 Sc, we have (S, ∅) A0 (S, {A3}). Assuming now that Q
starts with another input on c, the persistent set for Sc will contain inputs on c and d.
However, executing A3 is not allowed in (S, {A3}). Intuitively, while the persistent set
technique only looks forward, the sleep set technique also takes into account the past,
and indicates here that exploring A3 is not useful after A0, since it can equivalently be
performed before it.
5.5 Collapsing conditionals
The above techniques allow us, in principle, to compute significantly reduced set of
symbolic traces whose concretisations contain a witness of non-equivalence when such
a witness exists. However, the algorithm for computing persistent sets is quite inefficient
when applied on practical case studies: it relies on explorations of their symbolic LTS,
which is highly branching and too large due to conditionals. This is a typical problem of
symbolic execution, which manifests itself acutely in our setting, where the branching
factor of a state is generally the product of those of its configurations. We circumvent
this difficulty by observing that stubborn sets for a state (and its sleep set executions)
can be computed by analysing a transformed state where conditionals are pushed down.
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Our transformation can often completely eliminate conditionals in our case studies, and
is key to obtaining acceptable performances.
To justify an elementary step of this transformation, we consider a symbolic state S
containing a conditional we would like to simplify: S = S′[if u = v then P else Q]
(S′[·] denotes a state with a hole). We require that P and Q are respectively of the form
α.P ′ and β.Q′ where α and β have the same skeleton. We make the observation that,
independently of the execution and the evaluation of the test u = v, the same action
will be released and, in case of outputs, the precise output term has little impact in the
context of our symbolic analysis. Following this intuition, we would like to postpone
the conditional by considering Sc = S′[γ.if u = v then P ′ else Q′], where γ is
either the input α = β, or a well-chosen combination of the outputs α and β. The
choice of γ should ensure that the transformation cannot create action independencies
that did not hold before the transformation.
Formally, we assume a fresh function symbol ∆ of arity 4, and take Sc = S′[T c]
where T c is defined as:
– in(c, x).if u = v then P ′ else Q′ when (α, β) = (in(c, x), in(c, x));
– out(c,∆(t, t′, u, v)).if u = v thenP ′ elseQ′ when (α, β) = (out(c, t), out(c, t′)).
Proposition 8. For any execution S = S0
A1 S1 . . .
An Sn, there is an execution
Sc = T0
A1 T1 . . .
An Tn, such that, for any A and i ∈ [1;n], A ⇔Ti−1 Ai (resp.
Ai ⇔Ti−1 A) implies A⇔Si−1 Ai (resp. Ai ⇔Si−1 A).
Hence, T+(Sc) is a symbolic stubborn set for S and any sleep set execution from S
is also a sleep set execution from Sc.
Repeatedly applying this result, and an obvious analogue justifying the elimination
of conditionals whose branches are null, we can eliminate most conditionals from our
protocols, and compute stubborn sets and sleep set executions efficiently.
6 Implementation and benchmarks
The results of the previous sections allow us to compute a set of symbolic actions, that
can be used to restrict the search when looking for a witness of non-equivalence. By
Proposition 3, (P1; ∅) 6≈ (P2; ∅) iff a bad state can be reached from s0 = 〈|B1 ≈ B2|〉,
where Bi = {Ki | (Pi; ∅) τ
∗
7−→ Ki 6 τ7−→}. By Proposition 2, this implies the existence of a
sleep set execution in our trace equivalence LTS from (s0, ∅) to a bad state. By Propo-
sition 7, this implies the existence of a concrete execution whose underlying symbolic
trace S0 = 〈B1 ≈ B2〉I0>
A0 . . .
An Sn+1 is a sleep set execution in our symbolic LTS.
Such symbolic traces can be computed.
6.1 Implementation
To concretely realise and evaluate our techniques, we have implemented our symbolic
analysis as a standalone library called Porridge, and have interfaced it with Apte in
the first place, and then with its successor DeepSec, once this tool has been made avail-
able [19]. These tools perform an exhaustive search for non-equivalence witnesses using
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symbolic execution. Conceptually, this search can be seen as a naive symbolic explo-
ration, combined with an elaborate constraint solving procedure. The two aspects being
orthogonal, we can straightforwardly obtain a correct optimisation by restricting the
symbolic exploration according to the set of traces computed by Porridge.
Porridge. The library is open-source, written in OCaml, and available at [1]. The code
implements exactly the techniques presented above, with only a few minor additions.
It consists of ∼6k LoC. Performance-wise, we heavily make use of hashconsing and
memoization, but not from multicore programming yet. The design of the library, with
an independent POR functor, makes it easy to apply symbolic POR analyses to other
LTS; we can already perform POR for trace inclusion, and expect to use this flexibility
to adapt our POR techniques to slightly different protocol semantics.
Integration in Apte and DeepSec. As mentioned above, Apte and DeepSec are based
on constraint solving procedures on top of which an exhaustive and naive symbolic
executions exploration is performed. This exploration is naive in the sense that all inter-
leavings are considered (except for the specific case of action-deterministic protocols
already discussed in introduction). We have shown that restricting the exploration to
symbolic sleep set traces still yields a decision procedure for trace equivalence. This re-
striction is easily implemented, as lightweight modifications (∼500 LoC) of Apte and
DeepSec [1]. Note that the differences between the semantics presented in Section 2
and the ones used by those tools can easily be ignored by slightly restricting the class
of protocols. Concretely, we exploit the class of protocols with non-blocking outputs as
done in [9], which is not restrictive.
6.2 Experimental evaluation
We have carried out numerous benchmarks, focusing on DeepSec since it is both more
general and more efficient than Apte, and measuring the improvements brought by Por-
ridge in terms of computation time and number of explorations. The latter is also a good
indicator of the effectiveness of the reduction achieved since it represents the number
of times DeepSec explores an action and applies its costly constraint solving procedure.
Case studies. We verify some privacy properties on several real-life protocols of vari-
ous sizes by modifying the number of sessions being analysed. We model unlinkabil-
ity [27,5] of the BAC protocol [5] (used in e-passports, see Appendix A), of Private
Authentication [3] and of Feldhofer [24]. We also model anonymity [27,5] for some of
them. All our case studies are available at [1].
Setup. We run DeepSec and Porridge both compiled with OCaml 4.06.0 on a server
running Ubuntu 16.04.5 (Linux 4.4.0) with 12∗2 Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2650 v4 @
2.20GHz and 256G of RAM. We run each test case on a single core with a time-out of
2 hours (real-time) and maximal memory consumption of 10G.
Results. We report in Table 1 the relative speed-up of computation time and the reduc-
tion of explorations brought by Porridge. We plot the same information for numerous
sizes of Private Authentication in Figure 1. We observe that speed-ups are closely re-
lated to the reduction achieved on the number of explorations. As the size of protocols
increases, Porridge quickly speeds up computations by more that 1 order of magnitude.
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Test Size Time (ratio) Explorations (ratio) Time (seconds)
BAC (UK) 4 7.6 7.23 12.23
Private Auth. (ANO) 2 1.25 2.71 0.04
Private Auth. (ANO) 3 1.67 4.01 0.04
Private Auth. (ANO) 4 8.21 10.51 1.17
Private Auth. (ANO) 5 14.89 16.61 10.57
Private Auth. (ANO) 6 60.2 36.75 4864
Private Auth. (UK) 2 2.29 9.6 0.16
Private Auth. (UK) 3 14.06 29.77 79.57
Private Auth. (UK) 4 46.2 46.69 7171
Feldhofer (ANO) 2 1 4.72 0.03
Feldhofer (ANO) 3 4.63 7.08 0.37
Feldhofer (ANO) 4 22.47 16.3 544.93
Feldhofer (UK) 4 36.27 22.58 1510.09
Table 1. Relative speed-up and reduction of explorations with Porridge vs. without Porridge. In
the last column, we show the computation time without Porridge. The size refers to the total
number of processes in parallel. ANO (resp. UK) refers to Anonymity (resp. Unlinkability).
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Fig. 1. Relative speed-up and reduction of explorations with Porridge vs. without Porridge on
Private Authentication (ANO) of different sizes.
With each size increase, we add one role out of two, explaining the more significant
increases for even values.
7 Conclusion
We have presented the first POR technique that is applicable to verifying trace equiva-
lence properties of security protocols, without any action-determinism assumption. The
key ingredients of this technique are: an equivalence LTS that recasts trace equivalence
as a reachability property; a symbolic abstraction of the equivalence LTS on which per-
sistent and sleep set techniques can be effectively computed; a collapse of conditionals
that significantly speeds up these computations. Our technique applies to a wide class
of protocols, has been implemented as a library and integrated in the state-of-the-art
verifier DeepSec, showing significant performance improvements on case studies.
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Compared to (our) earlier work on POR for protocol equivalences [8,9], we follow a
radically different approach in this paper to obtain a technique that applies without any
action-determinism assumption. In the action-deterministic case, the two techniques
achieve similar but incomparable reductions: sleep sets are more efficient on improper
blocks, but the focused behavior of compression is unmatched with sleep sets. Finally,
we note that although sleep sets allow to recover a form of dependency constraint, we
do not know how to justify its use in practice outside of the action-deterministic case.
We hope that future work will allow to unify and generalize both techniques.
A crucial aspect of our new approach is that it manages to leverage classic POR
techniques, namely persistent and sleep sets, for use in our specific security setting. In
fact, we view this work as a first step towards bridging the gap between standard POR
and security-specific techniques. As usual in POR, many variations (e.g., in how we
integrate with the equivalence verifiers) and approximations (e.g., in independencies
or stubborn set computations) should be explored to look for performance gains. The
recent work on dynamic POR [25,4] (DPOR), which aims to find a trade-off between
performance and quality of the computed persistent sets, is of particular interest here,
though it is unclear at this point to which extent generic results can be extracted from
the above-mentioned works for re-use in our security setting.
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A Appendix of Section 2
In this section, we develop an example whose purpose is to show a protocol that can be
modelled in our syntax, and how a privacy-type property, namely unlinkability, can be
expressed through the notion of trace equivalence.
For illustrative purposes, we consider the BAC protocol used in e-passports. This
protocol aims at establishing a fresh session key derived from kP and kR. This session
key will be used to encrypt the subsequent communication, and protect the information
that are exchanged between the passport and the reader. Informally, we have:
1. P → R : nP
2. R→ P : {nR, nP , kR}ke,mac({nR, nP , kR}ke, km)
3. P → R : {nP , nR, kP }ke,mac({nP , nR, kP }ke, km)
where {m}k denotes the symmetric encryption of a message m with the key k, and
mac is a keyed hash function. The keys ke and km are long term keys shared between
the passport and the reader. First, P sends a fresh random number nP to the reader,
and the reader answers to this challenge by generating its own nonce nP , as well as kR
to contribute to fresh session key. This encryption together with a mac is sent to the
passport. The passport will then check the mac, and decrypt the ciphertext and verify
whether the nonce inside corresponds to the nonce nP generated at the first step. In
case, decryption fails or the nonce inside the message is not the expected one, an error
message will be sent. Otherwise, the message 3 is sent to the reader. After checking that
the message is the expected one, both entities are able to compute the fresh session key
derived form kR and kP .
Term algebra. We consider the signature
Σenc = {enc, dec,mac, 〈 〉, proj1, proj2, nonceerr,macerr}.
The symbols enc, dec, and mac of arity 2 represent encryption and decryption, and mes-
sage authentication code; concatenation of messages is modelled through the symbol 〈 〉
of arity 2, with projection functions proj1 and proj2 of arity 1. The function symbols
nonceerr and macerr are constants (arity 0) that are used to model error messages. Then,
we reflect the properties of the cryptographic primitives through the equational theory
induced by the following equations:
dec(enc(x, y), y) = x, proj1(〈x, y〉) = x, and proj2(〈x, y〉) = y.
Processes. The process P (ke, km) modelling the role of the passport is given below.
The processR(ke, km) modelling the role of the reader can be written in a similar way.
P (ke, km) = out(c, nP ).in(c, x).
if mac(proj1(x), km) = proj2(x) then
if proj1(proj2(dec(proj1(x), ke))) = nP then out(c, 〈mP ,mac(mP , km)〉)
else out(c, nonceerr)
else out(c,macerr)
where mP = enc(〈nP , 〈proj1(dec(proj1(x), ke)), kP 〉〉, ke).
Consider the two following configurations:
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Ksame = (P (ke, km);φ0), and Kdiff = (P (ke′, km′);φ0)
with φ0 = {wc′,0 . 〈m′R,mac(m′R, km)〉} and m′R = enc(〈n′R, 〈n′P , k′R〉〉, ke).
Intuitively, the configurationKsame represents a situation where the passport in pres-
ence is the one for which we have already listen to an execution (the interesting message
being stored in φ0), whereas Kdiff models the fact that the attacker is now in presence
of an other passport. If Ksame 6vt Kdiff , this means that the attacker is able to perform a
test that allows him to detect that the passport in presence is the same again.
Actually, we have that Ksame tr07−−→ (0;φ) with
– tr0 = out(c,wc,0).in(c,wc′,0).τ.τ.out(c,wc,1), and
– φ = φ0 unionmulti {wc,0 . nP ;wc,1 . nonceerr}
It is possible to produce the same observable actions starting from Kdiff , but this will
result in the frame φ′ = φ0unionmulti{wc,0.nP ;wc,1.macerr}. It is easy to see that φ 6∼s φ′. The
test wc,1 = nonceerr holds in φ but not in φ′, and thus Ksame 6v Kdiff . This corresponds
to a well-known replay attack discovered in [5] on French passports. This attack can be
easily fixed by using the same error message in both cases. In such a case, the inclusion
holds. This is a non trivial inclusion that can be automatically established by automatic
verification tools such as DeepSec.
For illustrative purposes, we have only considered here a simple scenario for which
configurations under study are actually action-deterministic according to the definition
recalled below (and used in previous works).
Definition 10. A configuration A is action-deterministic if whenever A tr7−→ (P;Φ),
and P,Q are two distinct elements of P , we have that P and Q cannot both perform an
observable action of the same nature (in, out) on the same channel (i.e., if both actions
are of same nature, their first argument has to differ).
However, as soon as we want to consider more complex scenarios involving several
passports and readers, we will have to deal with configurations that are not action-
deterministic. Indeed, several passports will be able to output a message on channel
c at the same time. Using different channels (e.g., one for each process in parallel)
as it is often done (in so-called simple processes) leads to an imprecise modelling, and
false attacks. Consequently, strong unlinkability is expressed as an equivalence between
processes that are not action-deterministic [5].
When considering strong unlinkability, we also note that using diff-equivalence in-
stead of trace equivalence, as is done in Tamarin and ProVerif when checking equiv-
alences for unbounded sessions, systematically leads to false attacks [27]. Therefore,
proposing POR techniques that are able to deal with non-action-deterministic processes
is an important research goal. Actually, as far as we know, the only tool which is able
to analyse the unlinkability property as described above on the BAC protocol is the tool
UKANO [27]: it deals with an unbounded number of sessions but only supports a very
specific class of 2-party protocols (and, of course, it is not a decision procedure). Other-
wise, the only generic verification tool that is able to decide such a property is DeepSec
and, like many other tools dedicated to protocols verification, it suffers from the usual
state explosion problem for which we propose a solution in this paper.
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B Proofs of Section 3
This section contains proofs originally presented in [26], adapted to our style of presen-
tation.
Two sequences of actions
w = α1 . . . αiαβαi+3 . . . αn and w′ = α1 . . . αiβααi+3 . . . αn
that are executable from s0 (i.e., s0
w−→ s and s0 w
′
−→ s′ for some s and s′) are equivalent
when α and β are independent in si, where si is the unique state such that s0
α1...αi−−−−→ si.
The class of a trace starting from s0 according to this equivalence relation is written
[w]s0 .
B.1 Persistent sets
Lemma 1. Let s and s′ be two states such that s w−→ s′ 6−→with a non-empty sequencew
of actions. For any s0 and w0 such that s0
w0−−→ s, there exists α ∈ pset(s0, w0) and w′
such that αw′ ∈ [w]s.
Proof. Let w = α1α2 . . . αn, and consider the following execution trace in the original
LTS
s
α1−→ s1 α2−→ s2 . . . αn−1−−−→ sn−1 αn−−→ sn = s′ 6−→
We show that, for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n, αi ∈ pset(s0, w0). We reason by contradiction,
assuming the contrary. By definition of a persistent set, we then know that each αi is
independent in si−1 with all the actions in pset(s0, w0). Therefore, we have that all
actions in the non-empty set pset(s0, w0) remain enabled in states sj with 0 < j ≤ n,
and thus they are enabled in s′ which is absurd.
Let αi0 be the first action inw that is in pset(s0, w0). By definition of a persistent set,
we know that for all 1 ≤ j < i0, we have αi0 andαj are independent in sj−1. Therefore,
considering the sequence w′ = αi0α1 . . . αi0−1αi0+1 . . . αn, i.e., the sequence w in
which the action αi0 has been moved at the first position, we have that w
′ ∈ [w]s. uunionsq
Lemma 2 ([26]). Let s and s′ be two states such that s w1−−→ s′ (in the original LTS) for
some sequence w1. We have that s
w2−−→ s′ for any w2 ∈ [w1]s.
Proof. By definition, all w′ ∈ [w]s can be obtained from w by successively permuting
pairs of adjacent actions. It is thus sufficient to prove that, for any two sequences w1
and w2 that differ only by the order of two adjacent actions that are independent w.r.t.
the current state, if s w1−−→ s′ then s w2−−→ s′. We assume that w1 = α1 . . . αβ . . . αn and
w2 = α1 . . . βα . . . αn. By hypothesis, we have that:
s
α1−→ s1 α2−→ s2 . . . αi−→ si α−→ si+1 β−→ si+2 . . . αn−−→ sn = s′.
Since α and β are independent in si, we have that:
s
α1−→ s1 α2−→ s2 . . . αi−→ si β−→ s′i+1 α−→ s′i+2.
Moreover, we know that si+2 = s′i+2. Therefore, we obtain that s
α1−→ s1 α2−→ s2 . . . αi−→
si
β−→ s′i+1 α−→ si+2 . . . αn−−→ sn = s′. This allows us to conclude. uunionsq
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Proposition 1. Let s′ be a final state that is reachable from s. We have that s′ is also
reachable from s through a trace that is persistent.
Proof. Consider a trace s = s0
α1−→ s1 α2−→ . . . αn−−→ sn = s′ 6−→ that is not persistent.
Let k be the smallest index such that αk 6∈ pset(s0, α1 . . . αk−1). Such a k exists, and
we have that 1 ≤ k ≤ n. We proceed by induction on n− k.
The trace w = αk . . . αn is non-empty and executable in sk−1. By Lemma 1,
there is αw′ ∈ [w]sk−1 such that α ∈ pset(s0, α1 . . . αk−1). By Lemma 2, the trace
α1 . . . αk−1αw′ can be executed from s0 to sn. It has the same length as our initial
trace and it is either persistent or has a larger first non-persistent index. We conclude in
both cases, either directly or by induction hypothesis. uunionsq
B.2 Stubborn sets
In practice, persistent sets can be computed as the enabled actions of a conditional
stubborn set, as defined and justified next.
Definition 11. A set of actions T is a conditional stubborn set for a state s if T∩E(s) 6=
∅ and, for all α ∈ T , for all s = s1 α1−→ . . . sn αn−−→ such that α 6↔sn αn, we have
αi ∈ T for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Proposition 9. If T is a conditional stubborn set for s, then T ∩ E(s) is a persistent
set for s.
Proof. Consider a trace s = s1
α1−→ s2 α2−→ . . . αn−1−−−→ sn αn−−→ sn+1 such that αi 6∈
T ∩ E(s) for any i ∈ [1;n].
Let us first establish that αi 6∈ T for any i ∈ [1;n]. By contradiction, consider the
smallest i such that αi ∈ T . Because αi 6∈ T ∩ E(s), this means that αi is disabled
in s but enabled in si. Hence there is a j < i such that αj 6↔sj αi. By definition of
conditional stubborn sets, we conclude that there is a k ≤ j such that αk ∈ T , which
contradicts the minimality of i.
We can now prove that αn is independent in sn with any action α ∈ T ∩E(s). As-
sume the contrary, i.e., α 6↔snαn. By definition of conditional stubborn sets, we would
then have αi ∈ T for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n, contradicting our first observation. uunionsq
B.3 Sleep sets
Proposition 2. If a final state is reachable from s in the original LTS, then it is also
reachable from (s, ∅) through a sleep set execution.
Proof. By Proposition 1 it is sufficient to show that any persistent execution towards a
final state can be mapped to a sleep set execution. We consider a persistent execution
s0
α1−→pset s1 . . . αn−−→pset sn 6−→ with sn final, and set out to turn it into a sleep set
execution from (s0, ∅) to some (sn, zn).
By well-foundedness of the lexicographic ordering over Tn, we can assume that
w = α1 . . . αn is minimal among the traces w′ ∈ [w]s0 that are persistent.
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Given one such execution, it suffices to show that, if there exists p < n and
z0, z1, . . . zp such that z0 = ∅, (si−1, zi−1) αi−→ (si, zi) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ p, then there
exists zp+1 such that (sp, zp)
αp+1−−−→ (sp+1, zp+1). In fact, it suffices to show that αp+1
can be executed in (sp, zp), and the existence of zp+1 will follow.
Assume, by contradiction, that αp+1 cannot be executed. Since
αp+1 ∈ pset(s0, α1 . . . αp) it must be the case that αp+1 ∈ zp. Let k < p be the
index at which αp+1 has last entered the sleep set, i.e., αp+1 ∈ zi for all i ∈ [k + 1; p]
but αp+1 6∈ zk. We have:
– αp+1 ∈ pset(s0, α1 . . . αk) and αp+1 < αk+1;
– αp+1 ↔si−1 αi for all i ∈ [k + 1; p].
Consider the trace w′ = α1 . . . αkαp+1αk+1 . . . αn obtained by executing αp+1 just
after αk. We have w′ ∈ [w]s0 , but also w′ <lex w. By Lemma 2, w′ executes from
s0 to sn. It is not necessarily the case that w′ is a persistent trace since the choice of
persistent sets may be affected after αp+1. However, we can apply Proposition 1 to w′
since sn is final. A simple inspection of the proof of Proposition 1 shows that we will
more precisely obtain a w′′ ∈ [w′]s0 = [w]s0 , which will share at least the persistent
prefix α1 . . . αkαp+1 with w′. Hence w′′ <lex w, which contradicts the minimality of
w among the persistent traces of [w]s0 . uunionsq
C Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 3. Let A0 and B0 be two alive configurations of same domain, and s0 =
〈|A0 ≈ B0|〉 where A0 = {A | A0 τ
∗
7−→ A 6 τ7−→}, and B0 = {B | B0 τ
∗
7−→ B 6 τ7−→}. The
following conditions are equivalent:
1. A0 is trace included in B0, i.e., A0 vt B0;
2. no left-bad state is reachable from s0 in the trace-equivalence LTS;
3. no left-bad, final state is reachable from s0 in the trace-equivalence LTS.
Before proving this proposition, we introduce three lemmas which state basic prop-
erties of the transition relation of our trace equivalence LTS.
Lemma 3. Let s = 〈|A ≈ B|〉 and s′ = 〈|A′ ≈ B′|〉 be two states such that s tr−→ s′
for some tr. Let (P ′;φ′) ∈ A′ (resp. B′) be an alive configuration. In such a case,
there exists (P;φ) ∈ A (resp. B) such that (P;φ) tr
′
7−→ (P ′;φ′) for some tr′ such that
obs(tr′) = tr.
Lemma 4. Let (P;φ), (P ′;φ′) be two quiescent configurations such that (P;φ) tr7−→
(P ′;φ′) for some tr. Let s = 〈|A ≈ B|〉 be a state such that (P;φ) ∈ A (resp. B). In
such case, there exists s′ = 〈|A′ ≈ B′|〉 such that s obs(tr)−−−−→ s′, and (P ′;φ′) ∈ A′ (resp.
(P;φ′) ∈ B′).
Lemma 5. Let W ⊆ W , s = 〈|A ≈ B|〉 with domain W , and s′ = 〈|A′ ≈ B′|〉 be a
state such that s tr−→ s′ for some tr. We have that:
– for all j and (P ′;φ′) ∈ B′≥j , there exists (P;φ′|W ) ∈ B≥j;
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– for all j and (P;φ) ∈ B≥j , there exists (P ′;φ′) ∈ B′≥j such that φ′|W = φ.
A similar result holds for A.
We are now ready to prove Proposition 3
Proof (Proposition 3). We first establish that ¬(1) ⇒ ¬(2). We have A0 tr7−→ (P;φ)
for some P , φ and tr such that, for any Q, ψ and tr′ such that B0 tr
′
7−→ (Q;ψ) and
obs(tr) = obs(tr′), we have φ 6∼s ψ.
We can assume w.l.o.g. that (P;φ) is quiescent. The trace tr can be written as tr1tr2
where tr2 starts with an observable action and tr1 contains only τ actions. Let A be the
quiescent configuration such that A0
tr17−−→ A tr27−−→ (P;φ).
Thanks to Lemma 4, we have that s0
tr−→ s for some s = 〈|A ≈ B|〉 such that
(P;φ) ∈ A. We now assume, by contradiction, that s is not a left-bad state. We have
that (P;φ) is an alive configuration, and since we have assumed that s is not left-bad,
there exists (Q;ψ) ∈ B≥age(s) such that φ vs ψ. First, we may note that B≥age(s)
only contains alive configurations. Thus, we have that φ ∼s ψ and thanks to Lemma 3,
we know that B tr
′
7−→ (Q;ψ) for some tr′ such that obs(tr′) = obs(tr), which is a
contradiction.
Now, we show that ¬(2) implies ¬(3). We assume that there is bad state s = 〈|A ≈
B|〉 that is reachable from s0. Let n = age(s), W the domain of s, and tr be such that
s0
tr−→ s. Let s′ = 〈|A′ ≈ B′|〉 be a final state such that s tr
′
−→ s′ for some tr′. Since s is
left-bad, we know that there exists (P;φ) ∈ A such that:
– either (P;φ) is dead, i.e., P = ⊥j with 0 < j < n, and φ 6vs B≥j ;
– or (P;φ) is alive and φ 6vs B≥n.
Our goal is to establish that s′ is a left-bad state too.
In case (P;φ) is dead with P = ⊥j , we have that (P;φ) ∈ A′. We assume that
φ vs B′≥j and we show that this leads us to a contradiction. Indeed, if φ vs ψ′ for
some ψ′ ∈ B′≥j , then we have that φ vs ψ′|W (since dom(φ) ⊆ W ). Now, thanks to
Lemma 5, we get that ψ′|W ∈ φ(B≥j), which contradicts φ 6vs B≥j .
In case (P;φ) is alive, thanks to Lemma 5, we know that there existsA′ = (Q;φ′) ∈
A′≥n such that φ′|W = φ. Independently of whether A′ is dead or alive, to conclude, it
is sufficient to establish that φ′ 6vs B′≥n. If φ′ vs ψ′ for some ψ′ ∈ B′≥n, then we have
also that φ′|W vs ψ′|W for some ψ′ ∈ B′≥n. Thus, thanks to Lemma 5, we deduce that
φ vs B≥n leading to a contradiction.
To conclude, we show that ¬(2) implies ¬(1). Assume that s0 tr
′
−→ s′ = 〈|A′ ≈ B′|〉
for some tr′, such that s′ is left-bad and that A0 is trace included in B0. We seek for
a contradicton. Let W ′ = dom(s′) and n′ = age(s′). Moreover, we consider such a
left-bad state for which |tr′| is minimal in length. Since s′ is left-bad, we know that
there exists (P ′;φ′) ∈ A′ such that:
– either (P ′;φ′) is dead, i.e., P ′ = ⊥j with 0 < j < n′, and φ′ 6vs B′≥j ;
– or (P ′;φ′) is alive and φ′ 6vs B′≥n′ .
Let tr′ = tr.α and s = 〈|A ≈ B|〉 (a configuration built on W ⊆ W ′) such that
s0
tr−→ s α−→ s′. Let n = age(s), we have that n ≤ n′, and we know that s is not a
left-bad state.
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Assume s′ is bad due to the first item and P ′ = ⊥j , then there is (P;φ′) ∈ A (dead
with P = ⊥j ; or alive and j = n), and since s is not left-bad, we know that φ′ vs B≥j .
In any case, we have that j ∈ {0, . . . , n}, and thanks to Lemma 5, we know that for
any ψ ∈ B≥j there exists ψ′ ∈ B′≥j such that ψ′|W = ψ. Therefore, we deduce that
φ′ vs B′≥j leading to a contradiction.
In case (P ′;φ′) is alive and φ′ 6vs B′≥n′ . Thanks to Lemma 3, we know that
A
tr′7−→ (P ′;φ′). We are going to show that for any ψ′ such that B0 tr
′
27−−→ (Q′;ψ′) with
obs(tr′2) = obs(tr
′), we have φ′ 6∼s ψ′. Assume, by contradcition, that there exists such
a (Q′;ψ′) with φ′ ∼s ψ′. We can assume w.l.o.g. that (Q′;ψ′)) is quiescent. In such a
case, thanks to Lemma 4, we know that (Q′;ψ′) ∈ B′, and because this is an alive con-
figuration, we have (Q′;ψ′) ∈ B′≥n′ . This contradicts our hypothesis φ′ 6vs B′≥n′ . uunionsq
D Proofs of Section 5
We first mention a weak form of soundness that our symbolic semantics enjoys, and
which will be useful in our proofs.
Proposition 10 (soundness). Let S and S′ be two symbolic states, θ ∈ Sol(S), and A
be a symbolic action such that S A S′.
– If A = out(c,wc,i), then out(c,wc,i) ∈ E (Sθ).
– If A = in(c,Xc,i,W ), then in(c,R) ∈ E (Sθ) for any R ∈ T (Σ0 unionmulti dom(S)).
Proof. The result directly follows from Definition 6. If S A S′ then Sθ can surely
perform any plausible concretization of A: A itself when it is an output or, when it is an
input, any of its concretizations with a recipe that is valid wrt. Sθ. uunionsq
Note that, if α is the enabled concretization obtained above, there is no reason that
Sθ
α−→ S′θ′ for some θ′: indeed, the branches of conditionals followed in the sym-
bolic semantics to obtain S′ may be incompatible with θ, and thus different from the
branches followed in the concrete α transition. This is not a problem for the weak form
of soundness that we require here.
Proposition 4. Let S = 〈A ≈ B〉IC be a symbolic state, θ ∈ Sol(S). Let s′ and α be
such that Sθ α−→ s′. There exists S′, A and θ′ w θ such that S A S′, θ′ ∈ Sol(S′),
α = Aθ′, and s′ = S′θ′. Moreover, if α is of the form in(c,R), the proposition holds
with A = in(c,Xc,I(c),W ) for any W such that vars(R) ⊆W .
Proof. The concrete transition Sθ α−→ s′ consists of the execution of the visible ac-
tion followed by some invisible steps, breaking parallels, evaluating conditionals, and
performing choices by duplicating configurations. If α is an output, take A = α; if
α = in(c,R), take A = in(c,Xc,i,W ) with i = I(c) and an arbitrary W ⊇ vars(R).
There is a unique symbolic transition S A S′ that performs A and selects the same
branches of conditionals, and this allows us to conclude. Indeed, the treatment of paral-
lel compositions and choice operators is deterministic.
Define θ′ to be θ whenα is an output, and θunionmulti{Xc,i 7→ R}whenA = in(c,Xc,i,W ).
We check that s′ = S′θ′: this is obvious if α is an output, since in that case λθ′ =
26
λθ. For an input, λθ′ extends λθ with an instantiation for the new input variables:
λθ′(x
c,i
ψ ) = (X
c,iθ′)(ψλθ′) = R(ψλθ′) = R(ψλθ), which is the message that has
been used as input in the concrete semantics for any configuration whose frame extends
ψλθ.
We finally check that θ′ ∈ Sol(S′). It has the correct domain to be a solution of S′.
The domain of λθ′ coincides with that of λθ for previous first-order variables. If any
new variable xc,iφ has appeared in S
′, then it will be such that dom(φ) = dom(S)∩W ,
hence xc,iφ ∈ dom(λθ′). To conclude that θ′ ∈ Sol(S′) it only remains to check that it
satisfies the constraints of S′: it must be the case since λθ satisfied the constraints of S,
and the newly added constraints correspond to conditions that held for Sθ. uunionsq
D.1 Independencies
Proposition 11. Let S be symbolic state, and A and B be two symbolic actions ex-
ecutable in S such that A ⇔eeS B. Let θ ∈ Sol(S), s = Sθ and α (resp. β) be a
concretization of A (resp. B). If α, β ∈ E (s) then we have that α↔s β.
Proof. We have that α and β are enabled in s. We consider the respective successors sα
and sβ of s by these actions, and set out to show that α ∈ E(sβ) and β ∈ E(sα), and s
has the same successor by αβ and βα.
By Proposition 4 we have that there exists SA, A′, θA w θ such that S A
′
 SA,
θA ∈ Sol(SA), α = A′θA and sα = SAθA, and similarly for B.
In case α is an output, since α is a concretization of bothA andA′ we conclude that
A = A′. In case α is an input in(c,R), we know that A = in(c,Xc,i,W ) for some
W such that vars(R) ⊆ W . Similarly, A′ = in(c,Xc,i,W ′) for some vars(R) ⊆ W ′,
but Proposition 4 tells us that we can choose W ′ = W , thus we can also assume that
A = A′.
Therefore, we have that S A SA and S B SB , and since A ⇔eeS B, we know
that SA
B SAB and SB A SBA for some symbolic states SAB and SBA. We will
now rely on our Proposition 10. We have that SA
B SAB , and θA ∈ Sol(SA), thus we
deduce that sα
β−→ sαβ for some sαβ . Similarly, we also have that sβ α−→ sβα for some
sβα.
It now remains to establish that sαβ = sβα. Applying Proposition 4 on sα
β−→ sαβ
we deduce that there exist SAB , B′′ and θAB w θA such that SA B
′′
 SAB , θAB ∈
Sol(SAB), β = B′′θAB , and sαβ = SABθAB . As before, we can assume that B′′ = B.
Similarly for B, we have that there exist SBA and θBA w θB such that SB A SBA,
θBA ∈ Sol(SBA), α = AθBA, and sβα = SBAθBA.
We claim that θAB = θBA. Recall that the only variables in dom(θAB) r dom(θ)
are those introduced by A (resp. B) in case A (resp. B) is an input. Moreover, note
that AθA = α = AθBA and BθB = β = BθAB . Hence, θA and θBA coincide on
the variable potentially introduced by A. Since θA v θAB , θAB and θBA coincide on
the variable introduced by A. Similarly, they coincide on the variable introduced by B,
hence they are equal.
Now, relying on the definition of A ⇔eeS B, we deduce that SAB and SBA have
incompatible constraints, or are equal. They cannot have incompatible constraints, since
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they share a solution θAB = θBA. Hence SAB = SBA, which allows us to conclude
that sαβ = SABθAB = SBAθBA = sβα. uunionsq
Proposition 12. Let S be a symbolic state and A and B be two symbolic actions such
that A⇔deS B. Let θ ∈ Sol(S), and s = Sθ. Let α and β be respective concretizations
of A and B. If α 6∈ E (s) and β ∈ E (s) then α↔s β.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that α 6↔s β, i.e., there is s′ and s′′ such that s β−→
s′ α−→ s′′. By Proposition 4, there exist S′, S′′, B′, A′ and θ′′ w θ such that S B′
S′ A
′
 S′′, θ′′ ∈ Sol(S′′), α = A′θ′′, β = B′θ′′, and s′′ = S′′θ′′.
If β is an output then B′ = B is its only possible abstraction. If β = in(c,R), we
have B = in(c,Xc,i,W ) with vars(R) ⊆ W , and B′ = in(c,Xc,i,W ′). However,
Proposition 4 allows us to choose W ′ =W in that case. Hence we can take B′ = B in
both cases. The same reasoning on α allows us to take A′ = A.
Therefore, we have that there exist S′ and S′′ such that S B S′ A S′′. Relying
on our hypothesis A ⇔deS B, we deduce that A is executable in S, and A/B are not
of the form in(c,Xc,i,W )/out(d,wd,j) with wd,j ∈ W . Since A is executable in S
but its concretization α 6∈ E (s), we deduce that A is of the form in(c,Xc,i,W ), α
is of the form in(c,R) with vars(R) ⊆ W and vars(R) 6⊆ dom(s) = dom(S).
Since α ∈ E (s′), we know that vars(R) ⊆ dom(s′) = dom(S′). To summarize,
dom(S) ( dom(R) ⊆ dom(S′). It must be that B = out(d,wd,j) for some d, j such
that dom(S′) = dom(S)unionmulti{wd,j}, and wd,j ∈ vars(R) ⊆W . This contradicts the fact
that A/B are not of the form in(c,Xc,i,W )/out(d,wd,j) with wd,j ∈W . uunionsq
Proposition 5. Let S be a symbolic state and A and B be two symbolic actions. Let
θ ∈ Sol(S), s = Sθ and α (resp. β) be a concretisation of A (resp. B).
– If A⇔eeS B, and α, β ∈ E (s), then α↔s β.
– If A⇔deS B, α 6∈ E (s) and β ∈ E (s), then α↔s β.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of Proposition 11 and Proposition 12. uunionsq
D.2 Persistent set computation
Proposition 6. Let S be a symbolic state such that EC (S) 6= ∅, and consider T =
{Aθ | A ∈ T+(S)}. For any θ′ ∈ Sol(S), the set T ∩ E (Sθ′) is persistent in Sθ′.
Proof. By Proposition 9 it is sufficient to show that T is stubborn for Sθ′ and contains
at least one action enable in Sθ′. First, we check that T contains at least one action
enabled in Sθ′: indeed, we know that there exists A ∈ T+(S)∩EC (S), and that it has
a concretization enabled in Sθ′ by Proposition 10. Second, we consider α ∈ T and an
execution
s = s1
α1−→ . . . sn αn−−→ sn+1
such that α 6↔sn αn, and shall establish that αi ∈ T for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
By Proposition 4, we know that there exist symbolic states S1, . . . , Sn+1, and sym-
bolic actions A1, . . . , An, and substitutions θn+1 w θn . . . w θ1 = θ such that
S = S1
A1 S2
A2 . . . An−1 Sn
An Sn+1
28
where θi ∈ Sol(Si), si = Siθi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1, and αi = Aiθi+1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Moreover, we can take the Ai to be in EC (Si).
By definition of T , we have that α is a concretization of some A ∈ T+(S). If there
exists some i ∈ [1;n] such that A 6⇔Si Ai, then the specification of T+(S) allows us
to conclude that there exists j ∈ [1; i] such that Aj ∈ T+(S). Thus αj = Ajθj+1 ∈ T ,
which concludes the argument in this case.
Assume now that A⇔Si Ai for all i ∈ [1;n]. We distinguish two cases:
– Case 1: α ∈ E (s1). By α ↔s1 α1 we obtain that α ∈ E (s2). Repeating this
argument, we actually have α ∈ E (si) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Hence its abstraction A is
executable in Sn, as is the case for An. Thus A ⇔Sn An implies A ⇔eeSn An and
by Proposition 11 we obtain that α↔sn αn, which is a contradiction.
– Case 2: α 6∈ E (s1). In such a case, since α ↔s1 α1, we deduce that α 6∈ E (s2),
and eventually that α 6∈ E (sn). Now, since we know that A ⇔Sn An, we deduce
that A ⇔deSn An. We have a concretization α of A that is not in E (Snθn), and
a concretization αn of An that is in E (Snθn). By Proposition 12 we deduce that
α↔sn αn, which is again a contradiction. uunionsq
D.3 Symbolic sleep sets
Proposition 7. Let (s0, ∅) α0−→ (s1, z1) . . . αn−1−−−→ (sn, zn) be a sleep set execution
in our initial LTS. Then, there is (S0, ∅) A0 (S1, Z1) . . . An−1 (Sn, Zn) a sleep set
execution in our symbolic LTS, and substitutions ∅ = θ0 v θ1 . . . v θn such that
si = Siθi, αi = Aiθi+1 for i ∈ [1;n− 1], and sn = Snθn.
Proof. We will actually prove the result with (S0, . . . , Sn) = abs(s0, α0, . . . , αn−1).
Each Ai is then uniquely determined as the only A ∈ EC (Si) which admits αi as a
concretization. We then proceed by induction on n, showing additionally that we have,
for all i ∈ [1;n], three additional invariants:
(a) for all A ∈ Zi, A is executable in Si
(b) for all in(c,Xc,i,W ) ∈ Zi,W ⊆ dom(Si)
(c) for all A ∈ Zi, for all σ such that Aσ ∈ E (Siθi), Aσ ∈ zi
Invariants (a) and (b) will immediately follow from the fact that we only put to sleep
executable actions, and that they remain executable as long as we keep them in the
sleep set (because they are⇔ee with the executed actions). Invariant (c) states that all
enabled concretizations of actions put to sleep in the symbolic semantics have been put
to sleep in the concrete semantics.
If n = 0 the result is obviously satisfied with S0 such that S0θ0 = s0 and Z0 = ∅.
Assuming that the result holds for n, we will now establish it for n+1. The symbolic
execution obtained from abs(s0, α0, . . . , αn) is an extension of the one obtained from
abs(s0, α0 . . . αn−1). By induction hypothesis we thus have some sleep sets such that
(Si−1, Zi−1)
Ai−1 (Si, Zi) for all i ∈ [1;n].
We first show that An is executable in (Sn, Zn). By definition of pset, since αn ∈
pset(s0, α0 . . . αn−1), it is the concretization of an action in T+(Sn)∩EC (Sn), which
must be An itself since An ∈ EC (Sn) and Anθn+1 = αn (distinct actions in the
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enabled cover cannot share a concretization). It remains to check that An 6∈ Zn. We
assume the contrary and seek to derive a contradiction.
– If An is an output, we have Anσ = αn for any σ. By Proposition 10, since An
is executable in Sn, Anσ ∈ E (Snθn), hence thanks to our induction hypothesis
(item c) Anσ = αn+1 ∈ zn+1, which contradicts the definition of concrete sleep
set executions.
– If An = in(c,Xc,i,W ), we have W = dom(Sn) since An ∈ EC (Sn). We also
have αn = in(c,R) and, since αn ∈ E (sn), vars(R) ⊆ dom(sn) = dom(Sn).
Let σ be such that Anσ = αn. We have αn = Anσ ∈ E (Snθn) by Proposition 10.
Thanks to our induction hypothesis (item c), we deduce that αn ∈ zn which is
again a contradiction.
The value of Zn+1 is forced by the (symbolic) sleep set semantics, as was the
case for zn+1. We only need to check our additional invariants for Zn+1. All actions
A ∈ Zn+1 were executable in Sn (either by (a) or by definition of the symbolic sleep
transitions) and satisfy A ⇔eeSn An, hence they are still executable in Sn+1. Invariant
(b) also holds, since dom(Sn) ⊆ dom(Sn+1), and we may only add inputs to Zn+1
when their domain is dom(Sn). We now check (c). Let A ∈ Zn+1 and σ be such that
Aσ ∈ E (Sn+1θn+1). We show that Aσ ∈ zn+1, distinguishing two cases:
– We first consider the case where A belonged to Zn and A ⇔eeSn An. Then, A is
executable in Sn by (a), and by (b) the domain of A (if it is an input) is included
in dom(Sn). Hence Aσ ∈ E (Snθn) by Proposition 10. We then have Aσ ∈ zn
by (c). By A ⇔eeSn An and Proposition 11 we also have Aσ ↔sn αn, and hence
Aσ ∈ zn+1 by definition of the concrete sleep set executions.
– Otherwise, A has been added because A ∈ T+(Sn) ∩ EC (Sn), A < An and
A⇔eeSn An. We have the analogue in the concrete semantics:Aσ ∈ pset(s0, α0 . . . αn−1),
Aσ < αn and finally Aσ ↔sn αn by Proposition 11. Hence Aσ ∈ zn+1 by defini-
tion of the concrete sleep set executions. uunionsq
D.4 Collapsing conditionals
The goal of this section is to prove the following result.
Proposition 8. For any execution S = S0
A1 S1 . . .
An Sn, there is an execution
Sc = T0
A1 T1 . . .
An Tn, such that, for any A and i ∈ [1;n], A ⇔Ti−1 Ai (resp.
Ai ⇔Ti−1 A) implies A⇔Si−1 Ai (resp. Ai ⇔Si−1 A).
Hence, T+(Sc) is a symbolic stubborn set for S and any sleep set execution from S
is also a sleep set execution from Sc.
We assume here that Sc is obtained from S by collapsing a single conditional, in-
stead of applying repeatedly this process (see Section 5.5). The general result can be
obtained by repeatedly applying the result limited to one collapse. Formally, we pose:
S = S′[T ],
T =
(
if u = v then α.P1 else β.P2
)
,
Sc = S′[T c], T c = γ.if u = v then P1 else P2 and:
– γ = in(c, x) when α = β = in(c, x);
– γ = out(c,∆(t1, t2, u, v)) when (α, β) = (out(c, t1), out(c, t2)).
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Our plan is to explicit the states T1 . . . Tn through an transformation pi applied uni-
formly on S1 . . . Sn: Ti = pi(Si). Informally, we need to replace non-executed instances
of T by T c. A different transformation should be applied to T when it is evaluated but
α and β have not been executed. Once these actions are executed, T and T c will be
synchronized again (up to terms). However, there are two main pitfalls. First, even if S
and Sc initially differ by only one conditional, this conditional can be duplicated along
an execution in different configurations due to non-determinism. Worse, those differ-
ent occurrences of the initial conditional that may occur in different configurations of
a single Si may have evolved differently along the execution: because their surround-
ing frames may eventually differ, and thus their input terms may also differ. In order
to keep track of all those occurrences of the initial conditional, we shall annotate the
conditional, making them recognizable from the others. Second, we shall keep track
of how potential variables of u, v, t1, t2 are instantiated by first-order variables as in-
puts preceding T are executed through the execution. This is needed in order to know
how to transform a potential occurrence a conditional in some Ti, typically for building
∆(t1ρ, t2ρ, uρ, vρ) with the appropriate substitution ρ.
Annotations. For the purpose of our proof, we equip the syntax of processes with
optional annotations that have no impact on the semantics and are only useful for
defining pi. First, we formally explain how this is done for the case of outputs. When
(α, β) = (out(c, t1), out(c, t2)), T shall be annotated as follows:
T = if∗ u =ρ v then out∗(c, t1[ρ]).P ′ else out∗(c, t2[ρ]).Q′
for an initial substitution ρ = ∅. When α = β = in(c, x), we shall use the following
annotation:
T = if∗ u =ρ v then in∗ρ(c, x).P
′ else in∗ρ(c, x).Q
′
for an initial substitution ρ = ∅. The annotation ∗ may thus label an action or a condi-
tional construct, while the annotation ρ keeps track of the instantation from variables
in u,v, (and t1 and t2 for the output case) to first-order variables. The semantics of
processes is adapted straightforwardly to our annotated processes. In particular, substi-
tutions performed upon input actions are propagated to ρ annotations, where substitu-
tions thus accumulate. Annotations being only a technical device to track information
through an execution, and construct our transformed states Ti, it should of course be
ignored, e.g., when testing for independencies in a state Si.
The projection transformation pi. Given a state Si, we define pi(Si) by repeatedely
applying the following transformations:
– Any occurrence of
if∗ u′ =ρ v′ then out∗(c, t′1[ρ]).Q1 else out
∗(c, t′2[ρ]).Q2
is replaced by
out(c,∆(t1ρ, t2ρ, uρ, vρ)).if uρ = vρ then Q1 else Q2.
Note that the terms u′, v′, t′1, t
′
2 and the processesQ1, Q2 may differ from the terms
u, v, t1, t2 and the processes P1, P2 that are initially in the conditional replaced in
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S because of some variables being replaced by first-order variables in input transi-
tions. However, we have u′ = uρ, v′ = vρ, Q1 = P1ρ, Q2 = P2ρ.
– Similarly, any occurrence of
if∗ u′ =ρ v′ then in∗ρ(c, x).Q1 else in
∗
ρ(c, x).Q2
is replaced by
in∗ρ(c, x).if uρ = vρ then Q1 else Q2.
– Any occurrence of out∗(c, t[ρ]).Q at top-level in a configuration is replaced by
out(c,∆(t1ρ, t2ρ, uρ, vρ)).if uρ = vρ then P1ρ else P2ρ.
In this case, we will necessarily have t = tiρ and Q = Piρ for some i ∈ {1, 2}.
– Any occurrence of in∗ρ(c, x).Q at top-level in a configuration is replaced by
in(c, x).if uρ = vρ then P1ρ else P2ρ.
– Any occurrence of w . t[ρ] in a frame is replaced by w . ∆(t1ρ, t2ρ, uρ, vρ). Note
that this includes frames of first-order variables, which themselves occur both in
configurations and constraints.
In particular, note that Sc = pi(S).
For some symbolic state T and a set of constraints C, we note T ∧ C the state T to
which the constraints of C have been added. We now prove the following proposition,
that trivially implies Proposition 8.
Proposition 13. (a) For any S = S0
A1 S1 . . .
An Sn, there exist C1 . . . Cn and an
execution Sc = T0
A1 T1 . . .
An such that Ti ∧ Ci = pi(Si) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
(b) Moreover, for any A and 1 ≤ i ≤ n, A ⇔Ti−1 Ai (resp. Ai ⇔Ti−1 A) implies
A⇔Si−1 Ai (resp. Ai ⇔Si−1 A).
(c) Hence, T+(Sc) is a symbolic stubborn set for S and any sleep set execution from
S is also a sleep set execution from Sc.
Proof. (a) This is obtained by induction on n, and we give below the key reasons why
it holds. First note that applying pi never changes the set of actions executable in a
state. More specifically, the states Ti are obtained by making the same choices through
conditionals as in Si (for the conditionals that are not postponed by pi). Finally, we
define the Ci to be the set of constraints added in Si because of conditionals modified
by pi that have been performed in Si but not yet in Ti. Formally, Ci is the set of all
pi(uρ) = pi(vρ) (resp. pi(uρ) 6= pi(vρ)) such that an action carrying4 the annotation
ρ is available at toplevel in a configuration of Si, and uρ = vρ (resp. uρ 6= vρ) is in
the constraint of Si — the role of pi here is simply to introduce ∆ symbols in frames
occurring as part of first-order variables in u, v and ρ.
(b) We actually prove the contrapositive, i.e., no dependencies are introduced when
applying pi. This is easily checked for ⇔de since pi does not change the executable
4 In case of an input, ρ is directly found in in∗ρ(c, x). In case of an output out∗(c, t[ρ]), ρ is
found in the term.
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actions, and since (a) guarantees that executions from Si−1 can be mapped to execu-
tions from Ti−1 (by action-determism of the symbolic semantics). The first part of⇔ee
holds for the same reasons, we thus concentrate on the second one. We consider some
executions
Si−1
Ai SA B SAB and Si−1 B SB
Ai SBA
such that SAB and SBA have compatible constraints and SAB 6= SBA, and we seek to
establish that there exist executions
Ti
Ai TA B TAB and Ti B TB
Ai TBA
such that TAB and TBA have compatible constraints and TAB 6= TBA. This will imply
Ai 6⇔Ti B as desired.
The existence of TAB and TBA is given by (a). We actually have TAB ∧ CAB =
pi(SAB), and similarly for other states.
Hence, all constraints of TAB (resp. TBA) are in pi(SAB) (resp. pi(SBA)) . The only
effect of pi on constraints is the last item of the transformation, i.e., the introduction of
∆ symbols in frames. Hence, if two incompatible constraints C1 and C2 existed in TAB
and TBA, they would be of the form pi(C ′1) and pi(C
′
2) with C
′
1 and C
′
2 in SAB and
SBA. By inspecting the arguments of ∆ terms introduced by pi in pi(C ′1) and pi(C
′
2),
one can easily deduce that C ′1 and C
′
2 must be incompatible as well, contradicting our
hypothesis.
We now verify that TAB 6= TBA. First, consider the case where SAB 6= SBA
because of a difference in constraints: there is a constraint C in the constraints of SAB
but not SBA. This difference persists after the projection, i.e., pi(SAB) 6= pi(SBA),
because the effect of pi on constraints is only to expand some output messages into ∆
terms, in an injective fashion (∆ terms contain all information from the original terms).
Hence we have TAB∧CAB 6= TBA∧CBA. We immediately conclude if pi(C) is in TAB .
Otherwise, it is in CAB , which means that the conditional has been evaluated in SAB
but not in TAB , where it has been postponed after the collapsed action γ. The postponed
conditional found in TAB will then be absent from any configuration of TBA having the
same frame, which gives us TAB 6= TBA. Now assume that a configuration of D of
SAB is absent from SBA. We show that pi(D) is absent from TBA. It suffices to show
that for all D 6= D′, we have pi(D) 6= pi(D′). If the mismatch is due to the skeleton
of processes (i.e., processes without terms) then it is preserved by pi and we conclude.
Otherwise, as argued before, differences caused by terms on the S side cannot disappear
with pi, because the introduction of ∆ terms is injective:
∆(tAB1 ρ, t
AB
2 ρ, u
ABρ, vABρ) = ∆(tBA1 ρ, t
BA
2 ρ, u
BAρ, vBAρ)
implies both tAB1 ρ = t
BA
1 ρ and t
AB
2 ρ = t
BA
2 ρ.
(c) We obtain that T+(Sc) is a symbolic stubborn set for S as a consequence of
(a) and (b). Finally, any sleep execution from S built on top of T+(Sc) is an execution
of Sc by (a). Furthermore, (b) implies that sleep sets we would obtain from Sc are
necessarily smaller, which implies that such an execution is a correct sleep execution
from Sc. uunionsq
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